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Understanding the Average Impact of Microcredit 
Expansions: A Bayesian Hierarchical Analysis of Seven 
Randomized Experiments†
By Rachael Meager*
Despite evidence from multiple randomized evaluations of 
 microcredit, questions about external validity have impeded 
 consensus on the results. I jointly estimate the average effect and 
the heterogeneity in effects across seven studies using Bayesian 
 hierarchical  models. I  find the impact on household business and 
 consumption  variables is unlikely to be transformative and may be 
negligible. I find  reasonable external validity: true heterogeneity 
in effects is  moderate, and approximately 60 percent of observed 
 heterogeneity is sampling  variation. Households with previous 
business experience have larger but more heterogeneous effects. 
Economic features of microcredit interventions predict variation in 
effects better than studies’  evaluation protocols. (JEL D14, G21, I38, 
O12, O16, P34, P36)
Questions surrounding the effectiveness of microcredit as a tool to  alleviate  poverty have motivated researchers to implement several randomized 
 evaluations of microfinance institutions (Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman 2015). 
These studies were designed to test whether microcredit might help poor house-
holds by  fostering  entrepreneurship or potentially harm them by creating credit bub-
bles (Ahmad 2003; Yunus 2006; and Roodman 2012). Yet consensus on the overall 
result of these  studies has been impeded by concerns about external validity; that 
is, concerns that the  studies may be too different from each other and from future 
policy settings to  permit  general conclusions (Pritchett and Sandefur 2015). On this 
question, the results of multiple studies in heterogeneous contexts offer more than 
the sum of their parts: they collectively provide the opportunity to estimate not only 
the  average impact but also the heterogeneity in effects across contexts. I perform 
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this joint  estimation using Bayesian hierarchical models to aggregate the evidence 
from seven  randomized  trials of microcredit. 
The concerns raised about the external validity of the microcredit literature 
apply to impact evaluations and social science more broadly. It is common for 
studies in a literature to vary in their economic and social environments, as well 
as in the specific implementations of the policy interventions and the evaluation 
 protocols chosen by the researchers. These factors make it unlikely that impact 
 evaluations of social and economic interventions measure exactly the same effect. 
Yet,  understanding the general impact of an intervention is important when  deciding 
whether to implement or subsidize this intervention in settings not yet studied. 
Evidence  aggregated across multiple contexts can provide a reasonable basis for 
general policy  recommendations, but generalizable conclusions may or may not be 
within reach for any given policy. If the average effect estimated using all the data 
is in fact composed of  substantially heterogeneous effects, predicting the impact 
of the intervention in a new  context can be uncertain or even infeasible. Thus, 
 heterogeneity in observed effects is often  interpreted as a measure of the literature’s 
external validity (Vivalt 2016, Allcott 2015, Pritchett and Sandefur 2015).
Aggregating the evidence on microcredit in the presence of concerns 
about  generalizability requires joint estimation of the average effect and the 
 heterogeneity in effects across studies; this motivates the use of the Bayesian 
 hierarchical  framework. The core challenge is to use the observed  heterogeneity 
in estimated effects as a signal of the heterogeneity in effects across some broader 
class of sites, while  correcting for the fact that some of the observed  heterogeneity 
is  sampling  variation (Rubin 1981). The hierarchical framework can  separate
 genuine  heterogeneity from sampling variation and simultaneously use this 
 variation to inform the uncertainty on the general treatment effect. However, this 
 correction implies an adjustment on the estimated effects from each study, and thus 
an  adjustment of their  corresponding estimated average effect (Gelman et al. 2009).
This interdependent uncertainty  creates a potentially challenging joint  inference 
problem,  particularly with a small number of studies. In this  setting, Bayesian 
 methods may offer improved  tractability and estimation relative to  popular 
 frequentist counterparts such as random effects or Empirical Bayes (Chung et al.
2013, Chung et al. 2015, and Gelman 2017).
My analysis complements previous efforts to aggregate the evidence in the 
 microcredit literature. Review articles such as Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman (2015)
and Banerjee (2013) have assessed the overall literature incorporating expert
 judgment; I build on their qualitative insights to estimate an average treatment effect 
and  quantitatively assess heterogeneity across studies.1 Previous formal analyses of 
1 I do not always confirm the results of the review articles. They often employ simple but  misleading 
 aggregation techniques such as “vote counting” the number of results in a literature that are  statistically 
significant  versus not (see Hedges and Olkin 1980 or Section 9.4.11 of the Cochrane Handbook (Higgins
and Green 2011)). The  results of such heuristics often differ from formal  aggregation  techniques; the
specific predictions of Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman (2015), which do not bear out, are on page 12
and 13: “ Our eyeballing suggests that pooling across would yield  significant increases in  business 
size and profits.” and “ One robust finding on consumption is a decrease in  discretionary spending 
( temptation goods, recreation/entertainment/celebrations).” Clearly, expert judgment is an important
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multiple  studies of microcredit and other interventions have separately estimated 
the average effect and the heterogeneity, rather than jointly addressing these 
questions (e.g., Allcott 2015; Pritchett and Sandefur 2015). Most of the work on
external validity in  economics has considered the problem within experiments or 
quasi-experiments and leveraged partial compliance structures without necessarily 
estimating a  single general effect (Angrist and Fernández-Val 2013, Bertanha and
Imbens 2014, and Kowalski 2016).2 The Bayesian hierarchical framework offers a
joint approach to the problems of  evidence aggregation and external  validity, and 
is now being adopted into  economics (Dehejia 2003; Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel
2014; and Vivalt 2016).
I focus on seven studies that meet the following inclusion criteria: the main 
 intervention studied must be an expansion of access to microcredit either at the 
 community or individual level, the assignment of access must be randomized, 
and the study must be published before February 2015 (the period of my  literature
search). The selected studies are Angelucci, Karlan, and Zinman (2015); Attanasio
et  al. (2015); Augsburg et  al. (2015); Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman (2015);
Crépon et al. (2015); Karlan and Zinman (2011); and Tarozzi, Desai, and Johnson
(2015). Due to the policies of the two journals that  published these papers— the 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics and Science— the full datasets are 
 accessible online. This data makes it possible to fit a variety of models,  incorporating 
 information beyond the scope of traditional meta-analysis and checking sensitivity 
to modeling choices.
I study the impact of access to microcredit on household business profit, 
 expenditures, and revenues in order to evaluate the initial claim of the Grameen 
Bank that microloans allow poor entrepreneurs to grow their businesses and make 
more profit (Yunus 2006). Yunus has also suggested that some households might
be able to open businesses for the first time, and perhaps even “beggars can turn to 
 business” (Yunus 2006); I pursue a strategy that may detect this effect. Yet households 
may  benefit from microcredit in other ways, such as increased total  consumption, 
 shifting to spending on consumer durables, or decreasing  spending on “temptation” 
goods due to greater hope for the future (Banerjee 2013). These  outcomes were not
 collected by all the studies, but I aggregate the available  evidence on  consumption, 
consumer durables spending, and temptation goods  spending. In all cases, I  examine 
the effect of increased access to microcredit, which is often  considered the  intention 
to treat (I T T) effect, due to the likely  failure of the stable unit  treatment value
assumption (e.g., see Banerjee et al. 2015 or Kaboski and Townsend 2011).
I find that the average treatment effects on these outcomes are typically small 
and uncertain, around 5 percent of the average control group’s mean  outcome. 
The  sign of the estimated average impact suggests beneficial effects on all 
 outcomes, but there is moderate to high posterior probability of a zero impact due 
to  uncertainty both within and across studies. I find that classical meta-analytic 
 component of evidence aggregation, but it is not a substitute for  statistical analysis. Banerjee, Karlan, and 
Zinman (2015) fully acknowledged that formal meta-analysis was a complement to their paper, not a substitute.
2 These methods are not ideal for literatures such as microcredit in which there are potential spillovers across 
households, and when the expectation of future borrowing opportunities may affect behavior today even in 
 non-borrowers (Banerjee et al. 2015).
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 techniques, which do not account for variation across studies, often underestimate 
the uncertainty in the predicted impact in future contexts, and can misleadingly 
declare “ statistical  significance” for the impact on some outcomes in the microcredit 
data. However, the results of both the hierarchical and classical aggregation suggest 
that the effects on the six household outcomes are uncertain and may be close to 
zero.
To assess external validity, I estimate the variation in effects across studies for 
each outcome; the heterogeneity is moderate compared to the average impact on 
a given outcome. I compute several metrics of heterogeneity in effects,  including 
a metric that scores genuine heterogeneity in effects against the average  sampling 
variation in the studies, to quantify the percentage of variation that is “local”  versus 
“general” (Gelman and Pardoe 2006). I find that, on average, across  metrics and
 outcomes, approximately 60 percent of the initially observed variation in  microcredit 
 treatment effects is due to sampling variation. The genuine  heterogeneity in effects 
is thus smaller than previously thought (Pritchett and Sandefur 2015; Vivalt 2016).
The Bayesian hierarchical models detect slightly more general information than local 
information, on average, such that effects in different sites can indeed  predict one 
another, and thus have some predictive content for the future impact in  comparable 
settings. Overall, while these is some variation in treatment effects, these RCTs 
appear to be reasonably externally valid.
Finally, I explore the role of covariates at both the household and study level 
to  further understand the observed variation in effects across sites. Conditioning 
on households’ previous business experience, I find that microcredit typically has 
a  precise zero impact on household profits for those with no previous  business 
 experience. By contrast, the treatment effect on households with business  experience 
is large, on average, yet more uncertain and more heterogeneous across sites. 
Conditioning on study-level variables, such as the average loan size, interest rate, 
unit of randomization, and pre-existing levels of microcredit access is challenging 
with seven studies: I fit a ridge regression to assess their relative predictive power. 
I find that economic features of microcredit interventions, such as interest rates, are 
more predictive of cross-site variation in treatment effects than differences in study 
protocols, such as the randomization unit; this suggests several avenues for further 
research.
I. Data
The seven studies I consider in this analysis are summarized in Table 1. Many of 
the studies aimed to test the initial claim of the Grameen Bank that microcredit 
 fosters entrepreneurship among poor households (Roodman 2012). Access to
microcredit should allow poor entrepreneurs to avoid reliance on moneylenders 
and grow their businesses, thus increasing their business expenditures, revenues 
and ultimately profits (Yunus 2006). All seven microcredit experiments collected
information on these three business outcomes. Advocates of microcredit have also 
emphasized that loans could allow severely credit-constrained households to open 
businesses they could not otherwise have opened (Yunus 2006). To ensure that new
businesses opening is counted as an average increase in profit, households with no 
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business or missing business data have their revenues, expenditures, and profits 
coded as zero. This was the decision made by the researchers in many, though not 
all, of the seven studies. To give my analysis a chance to detect this potential benefit 
of microcredit, I have employed this strategy throughout.
However, households may benefit from microcredit in other ways,  particularly 
by altering their consumption choices. This could imply that loan access  promotes 
increased consumption in general, but it may also change the  composition 
of  household consumption spending. In an environment with limited savings 
 products, credit and savings may function as substitutes, and microcredit may 
be used to  purchase bulky consumer durables items such as vehicles or school 
 tuition. This would imply greater spending on consumer durables in particular, and 
 perhaps decreased  spending on “temptation” goods as a result of this substitution. 
Reduced  spending on  temptation goods might also arise if access to microcredit 
increases a household’s  expectation of escaping poverty in the future (Banerjee
2013). Thus, although data on  consumption, consumer durables, and temptation
spending were not collected by all the studies, I aggregate the evidence on these 
outcomes where available.
Table 1 — Lender and Study Attributes by Country
Country
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Ethiopia India Mexico Mongolia Morocco
The 
Philippines
Study citation Augsburg  
et al. (2015)
Tarozzi, Desai, 
and Johnson 
(2015)
Banerjee, 
Duflo, 
Glenneister, 
and Kinnan 
(2015)
Angelucci, 
Karlan, and 
Zinman 
(2015)
Attanasio  
et al. (2015)
Crépon  
et al. (2015)
Karlan and 
Zinman (2011)
Treatment Lend to 
 marginally 
rejected 
borrowers
Open  
branches
Open  
branches
Open  
branches,  
promote loans
Open  
branches, 
target likely 
borrowers
Open  
branches
Lend to 
 marginal 
applicants
Randomization level Individual Community Community Community Community Community Individual
Urban or rural? Both Rural Urban Both Rural Rural Urban
Target women? No No Yes Yes Yes No No
MFI already  
operates locally?
Yes No No No No No Yes
Microloan liability
 type
Individual Group Group Group Both Group Individual
Collateralized? Yes Yes No No Yes No No
Any other MFIs  
 competing?
Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Household panel? Yes No No Partial Yes Yes No
Interest rate (intended 
 on average)
22% APR 12% APR 24% APR 100% APR 24% APR 13.5% APR 63% APR
Sampling frame Marginal 
applicants
Random 
sample
Households 
with at least 
1 woman 
age 18–55 
of  stable 
residence
Women ages  
18–60 
who own 
 businesses  
or wish to  
start them
Women who 
registered 
interest in 
loans and met 
 eligibility 
criteria
Random 
 sample 
plus likely 
borrowers
Marginal 
applicants
Study duration 14 months 36 months 40 months 16 months 19 months 24 months 36 months
Notes: The construction of the interest rates here is different to the construction of Banerjee et al. (2015); they have 
taken the maximal interest rate, whereas I have taken the average of the intended range specified by the MFI. 
In  practice, the differences in these constructions are numerically small.
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For all outcomes, I analyze the effect of a randomly assigned increase in 
access to credit from microfinance institutions (M F Is). This may occur due to
branches  opening at the community level, perhaps combined with outreach and 
 targeting, or it may occur due to random offers made at the individual level. In the 
 framework of some of the original studies, this increase in access is the treatment 
 assignment rather than the treatment itself: the access effect could be thought of 
as capturing the “Intention To Treat” (I T T) effect of taking up a loan. However,
as pointed out in Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, and Kinnan (2015), spillovers and
the  expectation of future credit access mean that an analysis defining those who 
take up  microcredit as “ compliers” may not capture the causal effect of interest. 
Credit market  interventions are often unlikely to satisfy the stable unit treatment 
value assumption at the  household level due to  informal financial links between 
 households and general equilibrium effects (Kaboski and Townsend 2011;
Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, and Kinnan 2015). Hence, the effect measured here
may be best  understood as the  average impact on an individual in a community 
with increased access to  microcredit. Potential concerns that this understates 
the impact of  microcredit on those who eventually take it up are addressed in 
Section VB and in other work (see Meager 2016).
Where possible, I conform to the decisions made by the original authors  regarding 
the construction and analysis of the outcome variables, but at times this concern 
was superseded by the need to construct each variable in a uniform way across 
the studies. Variables for which this proved to be infeasible in practice have been 
 omitted from the analysis. However in some other cases I was able to construct some 
covariates not analyzed by the original studies using their datasets (see Section V
for further discussion).3 I do not winsorize outliers because most of the studies
did not do so, and moreover Augsburg et al. (2015) found that winsorizing outliers
sometimes made results statistically significant when they were not significant in the 
full sample. If the extreme values do not change the point estimate but increase the 
uncertainty, then winsorising them may lead to analysis that underestimates the true 
uncertainty about the impact of microcredit.
II. Methodology
A. Hierarchical Models
Consider  K study sites in which researchers perform similar interventions and 
measure similar outcomes. Each study, indexed by  k , estimates a treatment effect 
τ k averaged across individuals in the study. Suppose a researcher is concerned with 
 estimating the average of these treatment effects across these contexts, an object 
often defined as  τ = E[  τ k ] . The studies don’t report  {  τ k } k=1 K : instead, they report 
estimates  {  τ ˆk } k=1 K . Some of the observed variation in  {  τ ˆk } k=1 K is sampling  variation,
3 As few of the microcredit studies collected individual-level baseline surveys, and many household covariates 
are plausibly affected by microfinance, the covariate analysis is limited. Other potential data issues with the original 
studies, such as attrition or sample selection, were left as they were in the online datasets and not further addressed 
here. 
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yet there is likely to be some genuine variation in effects across settings, often defined 
as  σ τ  2 = var( τ k ) . This σ τ  2 influences the uncertainty researchers should have about
the value of τ , and also captures a notion of external validity, as it  measures the extent
to which any  τ k predicts any other  τ k ′ . The core challenge of evidence  aggregation
is to separate  σ τ  2 from sampling variation, thus characterizing  uncertainty on τ and
assessing generalizability.
Hierarchical models address this challenge by jointly modeling sampling 
 variation and true heterogeneity across studies, an approach that owes much of 
its popularity to the work of Rubin (1981) on parallel randomized experiments.
Rubin considers a case in which the analyst has access to a set of estimated effects 
 {  τ ˆk } k=1 K and estimates of the associated sampling errors  {  se ˆ  τ k  } k=1 K . Rubin specifies
a relationship between the observed estimates and the unobserved  {  τ k } k=1 K , and in 
addition specifies a relationship between  {  τ k } k=1 K and the aggregate parameters of
interest ( τ,  σ τ  2 ). The Rubin (1981) model has a hierarchical likelihood in which each
site has its own treatment effect parameter,  τ k , but these effects are all drawn from a
common distribution governed by ( τ,  σ τ  2 ) as follows:
(1)  τ ˆk ∼ N (  τ k ,  se ˆ k 2) ∀ k,
 τ k ∼ N ( τ,  σ τ 2) ∀ k.
The Rubin (1981) model is fully parametric, yet it is more general than it
appears: it nests both the individual analyses in the literature and the results of 
classical meta-analysis. The choice of the Gaussian link between  {  τ ˆk ,  se ˆ k } k=1 K and 
 {  τ k } k=1 K is motivated by each study’s use of unbiased and asymptotically  normal
 estimators. As  RCTs in economics typically carry out inference under these 
 assumptions on their estimators, the Gaussian choice here often imposes no more 
structure than the original studies. The Gaussian distributional link between 
 {  τ k } k=1 K and  ( τ,  σ τ  2 ) ensures that the model nests the analytic framework of  classical
meta-analysis, the results of which are recovered by setting  σ τ  2 = 0 (Gelman
et al. 2009). If  σ τ  2 is set to be infinite, the Rubin (1981) model returns the original
 estimates. The Gaussian structure is also tractable and offers lower mean squared 
error relative to other options in many cases (Efron and Morris 1977). Recent work
has shown that Gaussian hierarchical models generally deliver reliable inference 
on the mean  τ and variance  σ τ  2 even when the underlying true distribution is not
Gaussian (McCulloch and Neuhaus 2011).
The Rubin (1981) likelihood in equation (1) is a particular case of a more
 general class of models, which can accommodate a variety of input data and dis-
tributional structures both parametric and nonparametric. An important general-
ization for the purposes of the microcredit literature is to consider the full data 
from each study rather than just the reported estimates. In particular, information 
on the control group means  {  μ k } k=1 K may be useful to the extent that these means
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could be correlated with the treatment effects. Incorporating this information, 
or any other  relevant  information, has the potential to improve the inference on 
 {  τ k } k=1 K and  ( τ,  σ τ  2 ) .
Consider some outcome of interest, such as profits for a household  i in study site  k , 
denoted  y i k . Denote the binary indicator of treatment status by  T i k , and allow  y i k to 
vary randomly around its conditional mean  μ k +  τ k  T i . The random variation in  y i k 
may be the result of sampling variation or measurement error, as in the Rubin (1981)
model, or it may be the result of unmodeled heterogeneity or uncertainty in  outcomes 
for individuals. Allow the variance of the outcome variable  y i k to vary across 
sites, so  σ  y  k  2 may differ across  k . Specifying a Gaussian likelihood for  y i k  provides 
a close analogue to the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions  performed in
the  original  RCTs.4 The following joint model, incorporating  control means and 
 treatment effects and permitting a correlation between them, can  aggregate evidence 
from the full data from all  K studies:
(2)  y i k ∼ N (  μ k +  τ k  T ik ,  σ yk 2 ) ∀ i, k,
 (  μ k   τ k ) ∼ N ( ( μ τ) , V) where V =  [ 
 σ μ 2
 
 σ τμ 
 
 σ τμ   σ τ 2 ] ∀ k.
Including additional covariates into the aggregation process could further 
improve inference on the treatment effects. Some microcredit studies  identified 
households’ previous business experience as a pretreatment predictor of 
 heterogeneous impacts from access to loans (Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, and
Kinnan 2015; Crépon et  al. 2015). If treatment effects vary by subgroup then
heterogeneity across sites could be partially explained by differing subgroup 
 prevalence in the samples. This would make the treatment effect in future  locations 
easier to predict and potentially allow for subgroup targeting. On the other hand, 
it may be that treatment effect heterogeneity across studies is located within a 
particular subgroup of households. With access to the full data, conditioning on 
household-level variables is possible as long as they are recorded; they do not 
need to have been reported by the original studies. For example, most microcredit 
studies did not report results splitting on previous business experience, yet  all 
studies collected this information.
Extending one study’s subgroup analysis to all the studies permits an  investigation 
of how general or replicable the detected subgroup effect really is. This can be 
done within the hierarchical aggregation framework. Consider for generality  L 
 household-level covariates, and denote these covariates  X ik for household  i in site  k . 
To specify a full interactions model—that is, to examine the power set 
4 The kernel of the Gaussian likelihood is the least squares objective function, so M L E on a Gaussian  regression 
mean delivers analytically identical point estimates to OLS regression. The standard errors may be different 
unless homoskedasticity is assumed in the regression, as robust or clustered errors do not have simple likelihood 
 counterparts. Of course when considering a data-generating model, the Gaussian assumption on the outcome data 
here is unrealistic. I discuss this and fit alternative models in my follow-up paper, Meager (2016). 
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of  subgroups—creates  2 L intercept terms and  2 L slope terms, henceforth, 
indexed by  p . Here,  X i k are all binary, so let  π( p ) :  { 1, 2,…,  2 L } →  {0, 1} L 
be the bijection that defines the full set of interactions of these variables. 
For  p ∈  {0, 1} L , denote  X ik p =  ∏ p=1 L [ X ik p ] 1 { I p =1}  . The model below incorporates 
these effects and remains tractable by enforcing  independence across the treatment 
effects in the  2 L subgroup blocks:
(3)  y ik  ∼ N ( ∑  p=1 
 2 L 
 [  μ  k p +  τ   k  p  T ik ]  X ik π( p) ,  σ yk 2 ) ∀ i, k,
  (  μ  k 
p 
 
 τ  k  p) ∼ N ( (  μ 
p 
 
 τ  p ) ,  V p ) where  V p =  [ 
 σ  μ p  2 
 
 σ  τ  p μ p  
 
 σ  τ  p μ  p    σ  τ  p   2  ]  ∀ p, k.
 A different model must be built to incorporate site-level covariates which  capture 
differences in the economic environments, features of the interventions, or study 
 protocols.5 For example, in the microcredit literature the loans offered were of 
 different sizes with different average introductory interest rates, in environments 
with different pre-existing levels of financial inclusion or microcredit market 
 saturation, and the studies were randomized in different ways. A similar set of 
 differences exists between studies in most literatures in applied economics. To build 
a model that considers the role of  M such covariates in predicting the variation in the 
treatment effects, denote the set of relevant site-level covariates  W k . Define  β τ to be 
the  M -dimensional vector of coefficients that capture how  W k predicts  variation in {  τ k } k=1 K , and  β μ to be the analogous coefficients for  {  μ k } k=1 K . The following Bayesian 
 hierarchical model estimates these parameters:
(4)  y i k ∼ N (  μ k +  τ k  T i k ,  σ y k 2 ) ∀ i, k,
  (  μ k   τ k ) ∼ N ( ( μ +  W k  β μ  τ +  W k  β τ  ) , V) where V =  [ 
 σ μ 2
 
 σ τμ 
  σ τμ   σ τ 2 ] ∀ k. 
Although these models use parametric likelihoods, this structure is less  restrictive 
than it appears. As in the case of the Rubin (1981) model, the full-data models 
shown above nest many popular aggregation methods, because these approaches 
often impose restrictive assumptions on  σ τ   2 (Gelman 2006). Pooling all the data 
5 In many cases, however, there will be as many or even more site-level covariates than sites; overfitting and 
even analytical intractability may follow. This situation arises in the microcredit data and I address the issue in 
Section VB. 
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together and running a single OLS regression with site-level fixed effects and a 
common slope  τ , as done in Banerjee, Duflo, Goldberg, Karlan, Osei, Parienté,
Shapiro, et al. (2015), is a special case of model  II.2.6 This approach does not
 estimate heterogeneity in the set  {  τ k } k=1 K , this  heterogeneity is not used to inform
uncertainty about τ or  τ K+1 . The same is true for classical meta-analysis that
 estimates τ by taking an average of  {  τˆ k } k=1 K weighted by their inverse sampling
variances. These aggregation methods offer no channel through which the data can 
signal that the studied effects are heterogeneous and may not contain information 
about each other.
Because parametric hierarchical structure permits estimation of  σ  τ 2 even with 
 relatively small  K , it brings data to the question of heterogeneity in the treatment 
effects across sites.7 This corresponds to a common applied definition of  external 
validity as the ability of any  τ k to predict any other  τ k′ (Allcott 2015, Pritchett and
Sandefur 2015). If the models above estimate  σ τ 2 to be approximately zero, there
is no unexplained heterogeneity across sites and thus perfect external  validity. 
However, the models may return an estimate of  σ τ 2 that is so large it signals
 negligible  prediction ability of any treatment effect in the set  {  τ k } k=1 K for any other
effect in any other contexts. It may also be the case that a moderate value of  σ τ 2 is 
 recovered,  signaling limited but not zero external validity. The estimation of  σ τ 2 is 
an  advantage of hierarchical models, as this parameter is itself of interest and the 
resulting  flexibility may improve the inference on  τ and  τ K+1 .
The variation captured by  σ τ 2 is also related to the extent of “information  pooling”
across sites that may occur when the hierarchical model is fit to the data. If the 
model detects  σ τ 2 = 0 , and thus perfect external validity, it pools all the data and
estimates a single homogeneous effect weighting all the data points equally. In this 
case, the average  τ is a better estimate of  τ k in every site than any site’s own  τ ˆk , so 
the hierarchical model “shrinks” the  {  τ ˆk } k=1 K toward each other by using the data
from site  k′ to adjust the estimate the impact in site  k and vice versa. But if  σ τ 2 is 
large, the hierarchical model will not pool information across sites, and thus will 
not shrink the original point estimates  {  τ ˆk } k=1 K together. The hierarchical models can
thus maintain the original partition of the data, which classical meta-analysis cannot 
do (Gelman et al. 2009, Gelman and Pardoe 2006). In this “no pooling” case,  τ is
an uninformative object, so the uncertainty intervals on it will be wide. Hierarchical 
models can also estimate intermediate values of  σ τ 2, and thus implement “partial
pooling,” shrinking the  {  τˆ k } k=1 K together to an extent inversely proportional to the
size of  σ τ 2 (Rubin 1981).
Hierarchical models do require that the treatment effects be “exchangeable” in 
order to perform well, which formally means that their joint distribution must be 
invariant to permutation of the  K indices (Diaconis 1977). This means, for  example,
6 Specifically, it would be the same as setting  σ τ 2 = 0 ,  σ μτ = 0 and removing the hierarchy on  μ . Results of
the two procedures will be identical if the structure on the unexplained residual variance is identical, but may not 
be identical if standard errors are computed using a standard error correction that does not have a simple likelihood 
counterpart. 
7 Although the upper level distributions in hierarchical models are non-parametrically identified (Andrews 
and Kasy 2017), in practice  K is often small, and functional form assumptions are required for tractability. 
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that researchers do not have any knowledge of the relative ordering of the  treatment 
effects before they see the data.8 Thus, researchers will only be able to assess 
 external validity for the set of sites that are in fact exchangeable, and the  predicted 
effect  τ K+1 only applies to sites exchangeable with the set of sites already studied.
As I aggregate only RCT data, the inferences here may not be  generalizable to con-
texts that could not plausibly have been studied with RCTs. Individual  policymakers 
must use their judgment in determining whether their local context is comparable to 
those aggregated here.
B. Bayesian Estimation and Inference
Although hierarchical models can be estimated using frequentist methods, as in 
“random effects” meta-analytic models, Bayesian methods have several advantages 
(Rubin 1981, Gelman 2006, Betancourt and Girolami 2013). Bayesian estimates
often have lower mean squared error for the parameters at the upper level of the 
model  (τ ,  σ τ 2) relative to maximum likelihood (Chung et al. 2013, Chung et al. 2015,
Gelman 2017). This can occur because the priors constrain the model to avoid fitting
the noise in the sample: the priors “regularize” the estimates (Hastie, Tibshirani, and
Friedman 2009; and Gelman 2017). Regularization is the introduction of  additional
 information to constrain an estimation procedure and prevent overfitting,  typically 
reducing the variance of the procedure at the cost of introducing bias (Hastie,
Tibshirani, and Friedman 2009). In the microcredit literature,  σ τ 2 must be estimated
from seven studies: the main challenge for estimation at this scale is variance, not 
bias.9 Priors trade an introduction of bias for a reduction in variance, which tends 
to be substantial enough in practice as to reduce the mean squared error overall 
(Chung et al. 2013).10 Frequentist alternatives produce unbiased yet higher variance
estimates of  σ τ 2 in particular, and thus tend to overestimate the magnitudes of  τ and {  τ k } k=1 K (Gelman 2017).
In addition, Bayesian methods may better quantify the uncertainty on  (τ,  σ τ 2) 
 relative to frequentist methods. Joint inference on parameters in hierarchical 
 models can be challenging because of the correlation between the uncertainties 
at each level of the model: inference on  τ and  σ  τ 2 depends on inference on all{  τ k } k=1 K , and vice versa (Betancourt and Girolami 2013). Markov Chain Monte
Carlo  simulation  methods, particularly Hamiltonian Monte Carlo, can effectively 
surmount these  challenges, but greatly benefit from informative priors that direct 
the algorithm toward a sensible part of the parameter space. For the  microcredit 
interventions, even before randomized trials are done, researchers can be  confident 
τ is not on the order of US$1 trillion PPP, and that  τ is closer to US$100 PPP
8 If researchers know that a set of  M covariates should be correlated with the treatment effects, they can use the 
model in equation (4) that only requires  conditional exchangeability. However, problems will arise if  M ≥ K , as 
in the microcredit data. This issue is discussed and addressed in Section VB. 
9 For those concerned about estimating any parameter from seven data points, consider that the alternative is to 
use zero data points and assume the parameter takes a single known value with certainty. 
10 Penalized frequentist methods also provide improvement over classical frequentist methods, such as random 
effects. However, in practice, frequentist penalties need to be tuned, typically via cross-validation. With only seven 
studies, the cross validation error will be substantial, so Bayesian methods are likely to perform better. 
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than 100,000  USD  PPP. Yet prior-free methods, such as simulated maximum 
 likelihood, do not focus the simulation on these reasonable areas of the  parameter 
space, which makes them slower and less likely to converge in practice. As a 
result, many frequentist methods, such as Empirical Bayes or random effects, do 
not perform joint inference at all, and instead condition on the point estimates of (τ ,  σ τ 2) , resulting in confidence intervals that can be too narrow.
Thus, Bayesian methods allow researchers to fit more complex and realistic 
 models to their data. This can be important when  K is small such that even  moderately 
flexible likelihoods may overfit the data in the absence of constraints. This  problem 
arises in the microcredit data when attempting to fit the joint model described 
by equation (2). Estimating the correlation between the mean value of the outcome
in the control groups, the  {  μ k } k=1 K , to the treatment effects  {  τ k } k=1 K when  K = 7 , 
is prone to overfitting. Yet assuming this correlation is zero, which is implicitly done 
in simpler models that ignore the control means or enforce independence, seems too 
restrictive. A compromise can be reached by fitting the model in equation (2) with
a reasonably strong prior on the correlation. Inference may be sensitive to the prior 
in these cases, and indeed, inference on the joint model (equation 2) is somewhat
sensitive to the prior on the upper level covariance matrix, although the final results 
are similar across specifications (see online Appendix B). I therefore fit the Rubin
(1981) model and an “independent” version of the joint model that imposes zero
correlation between the mean and the treatment effect, as robustness checks.
Priors are also useful in allowing economic theory and contextual  knowledge 
to enter the inference process formally.11 Consider estimating the  correlation 
between the average household business profits in the control group  {  μ k } k=1 K , 
and the  treatment effect on business profit  {  τ k } k=1 K . If everyone has similar latent
 productivity, then diminishing marginal returns would  suggest the  correlation 
should be negative, as smaller businesses should be able to  produce more 
and grow faster with the same input. Yet, if individuals’ productivity is 
 heterogeneous, high business profits in the control group could signal more 
latent  entrepreneurial talent, so that loans to this  talented population should 
have a larger impact, which suggests the  correlation should be  positive. Since 
the net observed correlation is likely composed of these  countervailing effects, it 
is unlikely to take an extreme value of either sign. This   information is encoded 
into the prior as a penalty for a large coefficient in either direction; this choice 
imposes  classical regularization (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman 2009).
In cases where the research community disagrees about the implications of 
 economic theory or contextual features, priors will need to be more diffuse to 
reflect the  diversity of beliefs.
In my main specification (equation  2), the covariance matrix of the parent
 distribution,  V , is the parameter that captures this correlation. Covariance matrices 
11 Information about the parameters enters via the likelihood in both cases, but the kind of information that 
can enter is different. Likelihoods can communicate hard constraints on parameters, such as support constraints or 
type constraints, but typically cannot communicate fuzzy constraints, such as “it is more likely to be positive than 
negative,” or similar.
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encode both information about correlation and the scale of variation, and I seek a 
strong prior on the former and a weak prior on the latter. Hence, I follow the advice 
of Gelman and Hill (2007) and decompose  V into a correlation matrix  Ω and  scaling
factor  θ . A prior of half-Cauchy(0, 10) on  θ permits the scaling to vary widely.
I use an LKJ-correlation matrix distribution prior with a concentration parameter 
value of 3, denoted  LKJcorr(3) , which favors correlations close to 0 (an  LKJ-corr 
parameter of 1 produces a uniform prior over the space of correlation matrices).
The remaining priors on all other parameters are diffuse, with variance at least five 
times as large as the variation in the data, to reflect the diversity of beliefs in the 
research community before these studies were conducted. Thus, I use the following 
set of priors for the joint model in equation (2):
(5)  ( μ τ) ∼ N ( (00 ) ,  [  1,000 2 0 0  1,000 2  ] ) ,
 σ yk ∼ U [ 0, 100000] ∀ k,
V = diag(θ ) Ω diag(θ),
θ ∼ Cauchy(0, 10),
Ω ∼ LKJcorr(3).
Less flexible models, such as the Rubin (1981) model and the independent version
of this full data model, are generally fit with weakly informative priors throughout 
the paper, similar in strength to the priors on  (μ, τ) above.
C. Measuring External Validity
External validity is often characterized by the extent to which the average impact 
τ predicts treatment effects across different contexts (Pritchett and Sandefur 2015,
Allcott 2015). This can be measured by the heterogeneity in  τ k across studies, which 
is captured by  σ τ 2 in all the models above. If  σ τ2 = 0 , a policymaker can learn as much 
about the impact of microcredit in Ethiopia from a study in Mexico as from a study 
in Ethiopia itself. If  σ τ 2 is large, then a policymaker in Ethiopia learns little about the
likely impact of microcredit in her country from a study of  microcredit in Mexico, 
no matter how excellent the study. In the extreme case, as  σ τ 2 becomes  arbitrarily 
large, a policymaker learns essentially nothing from studies that were conducted 
outside her setting. Thus, a larger  σ τ 2 leads to a wider “predictive  distribution” of the
impact in the next comparable study  τ K+1 . Because Bayesian inference produces a
“posterior” distribution by combining the likelihood and prior, this prediction is a 
full distribution, often called the “posterior predictive  distribution” of  τ K+1 .
The smaller the posterior estimate  σ ̃ τ 2 , the more data pooling across sites occurs
in the estimation, and the more a policymaker should update her beliefs about the 
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impact of microcredit in her context given the results of the RCTs in other  countries. 
The models will produce correspondingly narrow posterior uncertainty on  τ and on
the posterior predictive distribution on  τ K+1 . Therefore, for each outcome of  interest
I report σ̃ τ 2 as well as the entire posterior distributions of τ and  τ K+1 . The   latter 
 quantity is of particular importance as, conditional on the model, this provides the 
best guess of the impact of expanding access to microcredit in a new location.
A drawback of using  σ ̃ τ 2 or the width of the uncertainty interval on  τ K+1 as a 
metric of external validity is that it is unclear what exactly constitutes a large or 
small value of this parameter in any given context. Thus, it is useful to examine 
the “pooling metrics” associated with the Bayesian hierarchical framework, whose 
magnitude is easily interpretable. The most prominent metric is the conventional 
“pooling factor” metric, defined as follows (Gelman and Hill 2007, 477):
(6)  ω( τ k ) =   se ˆ k 
2
 ________
 σ ̃ τ  2 +  se ˆ k 2 . 
For each site  k , this metric decomposes the potential variation in the estimate 
in site  k into genuine underlying uncertainty  σ ̃ τ  2 and sampling error  se ˆ k 2. Here, 
 ω(  τ k ) > 0.5 means that  σ ̃ τ 2 is smaller than the sampling variation, indicating
 substantial pooling of information and a “small”  σ ̃ τ  2. In that case,  τ k is a better signal
of τ than  τ ˆk is of  τ k , and if policymakers and researchers update their beliefs about
the impact of microcredit based on the results of an RCT in a given context, they 
should also update their beliefs about the impact of microcredit in the general case.
This  ω(  τ k ) conditions on sampling variation in order to score how much
 researchers can learn about site  k′ by analyzing the current data from the rest of
the sites (captured by  σ τ 2 ) against what they can learn about site  k by analyzing
the current data from site  k (captured by  se ˆ k ). Yet from a frequentist perspective,
 conditioning on sampling variation may cause some discomfort, and the fact that 
the sample size can influence this metric may be undesirable. Thus, I also compute 
two additional metrics as robustness checks. The first such metric is a “brute force” 
version of the conventional pooling metric, which scores how closely aligned the 
posterior mean of the treatment effect in site  k , denoted  τ ̃k , is to the posterior mean
of the general effect  τ ̃ versus the separated no-pooling estimate  τ ˆk . I define this as
follows:
(7) ω b (  τ k ) ≡ {ω :  τ ̃k = ω τ ̃ + (1 − ω)  τ ˆk }.
The motivation for  ω b (  τ k ) is that in the Rubin (1981) model it is identical to the
conventional pooling metric, but it is not identical in more complex models that 
pool across multiple parameters (such as model II.2).12 As a robustness check I also
 compute the “generalized pooling factor” defined in Gelman and Pardoe (2006),
which takes a different approach using posterior variation in the deviations of each 
12 I manually constrain it to take values between  [0, 1] as the rare occasions on which it falls outside this range
are due to shrinkage on other parameters rather than due to any feature of the parameters in question. 
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τ k from  τ .13 Gelman and Pardoe (2006) suggest interpreting  λ  τ > 0.5 as indicating
a higher degree of general or “population-level” information relative to the degree 
of site-specific information.
III. The General Impact of Microcredit Expansions on Household Outcomes
The general impact of expanding access to microcredit on key household  outcomes 
is an important parameter for a policymaker deciding whether to  recommend 
 microcredit programs, and perhaps even subsidize them, in countries not studied 
with randomized trials. Aggregating evidence across multiple contexts can provide 
a reasonable basis for such recommendations.14 In all the Bayesian hierarchical 
 models from Section II, this general effect is captured by  τ , the mean of the  parent
distribution from which all site-specific treatment effects are drawn. This is the 
expected value of the treatment effect in all sites that are broadly comparable to the 
current set of sites. In order to test the claim that microcredit helps households by 
fostering entrepreneurship, I perform inference on  τ for household business expen-
ditures, revenues, and profits. To examine other potential welfare benefits through 
changes in consumption behavior, I also analyze consumption, consumer durables 
spending, and temptation goods spending for those sites that recorded them.
To estimate  τ for each outcome variable, I fit the model described by equation (2)
after standardizing all units to USD PPP over a two week period (indexed to 2010
dollars). Table 2 reports the posterior means, which are the most likely value of
the treatment effects, and posterior quantiles, which describe the uncertainty about 
these parameters, for the full joint model. For comparison, the table also shows 
the results of a simple OLS full-pooling regression with fixed effects for country 
(as in Banerjee, Duflo, Goldberg, Karlan, Osei, Parienté, Shapiro, et al. 2015).
The graph in Figure  1 shows the posterior distributions of  τ for each of the six
outcomes, and for comparison, the sampling distribution of the OLS  estimator 
for the full-pooling model’s estimate of  τ . The independent model  specification,
which does not exploit the correlation between control means and treatment 
effects and is fit as a robustness check due to the sensitivity of the joint model, 
is also shown in the table and in Figure  2. These results are broadly robust 
13 Let  E post [ · ] denote the expectation taken with respect to the full posterior distribution, and define  ϵ k =  τ k − τ . 
Then the generalized pooling factor for  τ is defined:
(8)  λ  τ ≡ 1 −  
 1 _ 
K − 1  ∑ k=1 K ( E post [  ϵ k ] −  ‾ E post [  ϵ k ]) 2   _____________________________ 
 E post   [ 1 _ K − 1  ∑ k=1 K (  ϵ k −  
_
 ϵk ) 2 ] 
 . 
The denominator is the posterior average variance of the errors, and the numerator is the variance of the  posterior 
average error across sites. If the numerator is relatively large, then there is little pooling in the sense that the variance 
in the errors is largely determined by variance across the blocks of site-specific errors; if the numerator is relatively 
small, then there is substantial pooling. 
14 The aggregation exercise conducted in this paper is a necessary input into making decisions about policy 
itself and about the trade-offs involved in multisite program evaluation, but it is not sufficient for such  decision 
making. This is both because it is left to each policymaker’s judgment to determine whether their settings of interest 
are exchangeable with the settings studied, and because there are unknown risks involved in the decisions made 
by policymakers, the cost of gathering more information, and other variables. One would need a decision theoretic 
framework to address this properly; this is left for future research. 
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to the omission of any single study, and to alternative prior specifications 
(see online Appendix B).
The results suggest that the effect of microcredit is likely to be positive but small 
in magnitude relative to control group average outcomes, and there is a  substantial 
probability of essentially zero impact. For example, the posterior mean  τ ̃ for profit is
about US$7 PPP per two weeks, while the control group mean is about US$95 PPP 
per two weeks, and the control group standard deviation is US$160 PPP per two 
weeks. An average increase of less than 8 percent of the current average profit, and 
less than 5 percent of the standard deviation, is not likely to be a transformative 
change for a household. In addition, while there is only a 15  percent  approximate 
chance that the impact is negative, on average, the probability of an impact of 
US$13 PPP per two weeks is also no more than 15 percent. Although there is little 
 evidence that microcredit generally harms borrowers, as was feared by many of its 
critics, there is also little evidence of an effect that could transform poor  households 
into  prosperous entrepreneurs, as was initially claimed by its advocates.
Table 2 — Average Treatment Effect of Microcredit Intervention ( τ )
Estimate Posterior distribution quantiles
Outcome Model  τ ̃ 2.5th 25th 75th 97.5th
Profit BHM ( joint ) 6.8 −3.0 1.8 10.4 24.5
BHM (independent) 7.3 −4.7 1.9 11.2 27.5
Full pooling 7.3 −1.8 4.1 10.4 16.3
Expenditures BHM ( joint ) 6.7 −2.3 2.6 9.7 22.1
BHM (independent) 8.4 −3.9 3.44 12.0 27.6
Full pooling 13.0 −2.6 7.7 18.4 28.6
Revenues BHM ( joint ) 14.5 −1.4 6.6 19.9 43.5
BHM (independent) 19.9 −6.2 9.0 28.1 60.1
Full pooling 22.5 4.6 16.3 28.6 40.4
Consumption BHM ( joint ) 3.4 −6.3 0.8 5.9 13.2
BHM (independent) 3.8 −11.3 0.4 7.1 22.2
Full pooling 4.6 −1.1 2.6 6.6 10.4
Consumer
 durables
BHM ( joint ) 1.8 −3.9 0.7 2.9 8.3
BHM (independent) 2.1 −11.3 0.5 3.4 16.2
Full pooling 2.3 −23.9 −6.7 11.3 28.5
Temptation
 goods
BHM ( joint ) −0.8 −3.3 −1.3 −0.2 1.3
BHM (independent) −0.8 −3.6 −1.3 −0.2 1.4
Full pooling −0.6 −1.1 −0.8 −0.5 −0.2
Notes: All effects are in USD PPP per fortnight. The BHM ( joint ) refers to the model that
 estimates effects on both the mean (location) and dispersion of the outcome distribution; in this 
case the dispersion is measured by the mean absolute deviations. The BHM ( independent) does 
not exploit correlation between the control means and treatment effects, serving as a  robustness 
and sensitivity check. The full pooling model is simply a linear regression of  outcome on 
 treatment status with country fixed effects, with clustered standard errors at the country level. 
The p-values and Hochberg-corrected p-values for the hypothesis that  τ = 0 for each  outcome 
are: 
Profit Expenditures Revenues Consumption Durables Temptation
p-values 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.0
Adjusted 
p-values
0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.0
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Figure 1. Graph of Posteriors for Each  τ from the Main Specification of the  
Joint Bayesian Hierarchical Model (BHM), with the Full Pooling OLS Intervals  
for Comparison 
Notes: For the BHM, the thin line covers the central 95 percent posterior interval, 
the box  covers the central 50 percent posterior interval, and the vertical bar within the box 
marks the posterior mean. For the OLS, the thin line covers the standard 95 percent confidence 
interval, the box covers a 50 percent confidence interval computed in the same way, and the 
vertical bar within the box marks the estimate.
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Figure 2. Graph of Posteriors for Each  τ from the Independent Model,  
with the Full Pooling OLS Intervals for Comparison 
Note: Interpretation as in Figure 1.
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Policymakers are often encouraged to use null hypothesis significance testing or 
compute p-values to make decisions about which interventions have “real” impacts. 
Within that framework, for revenues and temptation goods, the full pooling model fit 
with OLS gives a substantially different result to the Bayesian hierarchical  models. 
Testing at the 5 percent level in the full pooling model would declare these two vari-
ables “statistically significant,” but the hierarchical model finds that their  central 95 
percent posterior intervals include 0 comfortably. This remains true for  temptation 
goods even when a Hochberg correction for multiple testing is applied (see Table 2).
This difference arises because the full pooling model can neither detect heteroge-
neity nor incorporate this heterogeneity across sites into its estimate of the uncer-
tainty about  τ . Bayesian methods — or at least, avoiding a “statistical significance
filter”— may give policymakers a more accurate understanding of the impact of 
microcredit.
To understand why the Bayesian hierarchical model consistently places more 
probability mass near zero than the full pooling model does for the microcredit 
data, it is useful to examine the study-specific treatment effects  {  τ k } k=1 K and their 
 no-pooling estimates  {  τ ˆk } k=1 K , as shown in Figure  3.15 In almost all cases, the
more precisely estimated effects are closest to zero. Figure 3 suggests that there 
is  substantial pooling for all outcomes, and the cluster of precise studies near zero 
pulls the less precise studies dispersed widely around them in toward zero.
These findings differ from the prediction of Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman (2015)
that  combining the six 2015 studies and running pooled regressions might find a 
 beneficial and  significant impact on profit, business expenditures, and  temptation 
spending. This  was a reasonable conjecture: for example, four of the isolated  τ ˆk 
 estimates on profit were positive and reasonably large but statistically not  significant, 
and pooling does tend to increase power and precision. For business revenues and 
temptation spending, the full-pooling OLS model does indeed exclude 0 in the 
95 percent interval, but the hierarchical model overturns this result. My findings 
also differ from those of Vivalt (2016), which reports a small negative impact of
 microcredit on profit. However, Vivalt’s analysis aggregates a different set of  studies, 
including several observational studies; the quantity being aggregated is potentially 
different to the treatment effect estimated here.
IV. Heterogeneity in the Impact of Microcredit Expansions
Although the average impact of microcredit is important for policy purposes, 
this alone does not provide a policymaker with compelling reason to recommend or 
 subsidize microcredit in settings not yet studied. If this average is composed of many 
heterogeneous effects, it will be at best uncertain and at worst infeasible to predict the 
impact of microcredit in a new context. Quantifying the  heterogeneity of the effects 
and thus the external validity of this average effect is a concern for both research 
15 Due to the occasionally varying scales of the sampling error, not all intervals have been fully displayed 
 graphically from end to end, but this information can be found in the tables in Appendix A. The independent model 
results for the same variables are shown in Figure 4 and are similar. 
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Figure 3. Graph of Posteriors for Each  τ k from the Main Specification of the Joint Model, 
with the No-Pooling OLS Intervals for Comparison
Notes: As the scales of the sampling error differ across sites, some intervals have not been fully shown here. 
For the BHM, the thin line covers the central 95 percent posterior interval, the box covers the central 50 percent 
posterior interval, and the vertical bar within the box marks the posterior mean. For the OLS, the thin line  covers 
the standard 95 percent confidence interval, the box covers a 50 percent confidence interval computed in the same 
way, and the vertical bar within the box marks the estimate. Display is truncated in some cases. The tables in 
online Appendix A provide the values of these four quantiles and the mean for all marginal posteriors for the main 
 specification model, without truncation.
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Figure 4. Graph of Posteriors for Each  τ k from the Independent Model, with the No-Pooling OLS
Intervals for Comparison 
Notes: For the BHM, the thin line covers the central 95 percent posterior interval, the box covers the central 
50  percent posterior interval, and the vertical bar within the box marks the posterior mean. For the OLS, the thin line 
covers the standard 95 percent confidence interval, the box covers a 50 percent confidence interval computed in the 
same way, and the vertical bar within the box marks the estimate. Display is truncated in some cases.
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and policy. The existing microcredit studies differed in their economic contexts, 
study protocols, population compositions, and along variety of other dimensions 
(Table 1). Given these differences, the heterogeneity in the existing studies — and
thus their ability to predict each others’ treatment effects—provides a signal of the 
predictive power of this set of studies for a similar yet unstudied context.
To quantify the heterogeneity in the site-specific treatment effects of  microcredit 
expansions, I now report the metrics discussed in Section  II. Table  3 displays 
the  conventional pooling metrics,  ω(τ) for each outcome, which measures the
 percentage of total variation attributable to sampling variation. I compute the brute 
force  pooling metric  ω ̃ and the Gelman and Pardoe (2006) metric  λ for a more
 comprehensive  assessment of general versus local information.16 I also compute the 
pooling  metrics for the control group means  {  μ k } k=1 K , because if the control means are 
similar, then finding similar treatment effects may only reflect  similarities in  chosen 
study  locations. If, on the other hand, similar treatment effects  accompany dissim-
ilar control group means, then policy recommendations can be more  confidently 
 extrapolated to somewhat heterogeneous contexts. I find  reasonable  similarity among 
treatment effects, with an average of 60 percent of observed  variation attributed to 
sampling error across all metrics and all outcomes. By contrast, there is no  pooling 
of information on the control group means: whatever similarities are evident in the 
treatment effects do not reflect preexisting similarities in the study populations. This 
suggests that microcredit access produces similar, although not identical,  treatment 
effects even in heterogeneous populations.
To get closer to the ideal of predicting treatment effects in a new context, 
the  posterior predictive distributions of  τ K+1 for all outcomes of interest are shown
16 As a robustness check, I also compute these metrics for the model that enforces independence between  μ and 
τ , and the results are shown in Table 4. 
Table 3 — Pooling Factors from the Joint Model
Treatment effects Control group means
Outcome  ω( τ )  ω ˘ ( τ )  λ(τ )  ω( μ )  ω ˘ ( μ )  λ( μ ) 
Profit 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.0
Expenditures 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.0
Revenues 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.0
Consumption 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.0
Consumer durables 0.3 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Temptation goods 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.0
Notes: All pooling factors have support on [0, 1], with 0 indicating no pooling and 1 indicating 
full pooling. These are simple averages computed across all sites in the data. The  ω( ⋅ ) refers to
the conventional pooling metric that scores signal strength at the general level against average 
signal strength at the local level. The  ω ˘ ( ⋅ ) refers to the proximity-based “brute force” pooling
metric that measures the geometric proximity of the partial pooling estimate to the no-pooling 
and full pooling estimates. The  λ( ⋅ ) refers to the Gelman and Pardoe (2006) pooling metric
that scores the posterior variation at the general level against the average posterior variation 
at the local level.
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in Figure  5, with the full-pooling OLS distributions shown for comparison.17 
The  predictive intervals are substantially wider than the OLS estimate’s intervals, 
reflecting that there is some heterogeneity in the effects. This heterogeneity increases 
17 The results of the independent model are shown in Figure 6, and are somewhat wider than the joint model 
because using the observed (typically positive) correlation between the control mean and treatment effect improves 
fit. 
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Figure 5. Posterior Predictive Distributions for the Next Site,  τ K+1 , 
Compared with OLS 
Notes: For the BHM, the thin line covers the central 95 percent posterior predictive interval, 
the box covers the central 50 percent posterior predictive interval, and the vertical bar within 
the box marks the posterior mean. For the OLS, the thin line covers the standard 95 percent 
 confidence interval, the box covers a 50 percent confidence interval computed in the same way, 
and the vertical bar within the box marks the estimate.
Table 4 — Pooling Factors from the Independent Model
Treatment effects Control group means
Outcome  ω( τ )  ω ˘ ( τ )  λ(τ )  ω( μ )  ω ˘ ( μ )  λ( μ ) 
Profit 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Expenditures 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.0
Revenues 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Consumption 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.0
Consumer durables 0.3 0.4 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Temptation goods 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.0
Notes: All pooling factors have support on [0, 1], with 0 indicating no pooling and 1 indicating 
full pooling. These are simple averages computed across all sites in the data. The  ω( ⋅ ) refers to
the conventional pooling metric that scores signal strength at the general level against average 
signal strength at the local level. The  ω ˘ ( ⋅ ) refers to the proximity-based “ brute force” pooling 
metric that measures the geometric proximity of the partial pooling estimate to the no-pooling 
and full pooling estimates. The  λ ( ⋅ ) refers to the Gelman and Pardoe (2006) pooling metric
that scores the posterior variation at the general level against the average posterior variation 
at the local level.
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the chances that a new context may not exhibit a positive impact form microcredit: 
treatment effect for almost all the outcomes has a 25 percent chance of realizing 
in a socially undesirable direction. For example, the next site’s treatment effect on 
profit has a 50 percent chance of being between US$0 and US$11 PPP, a 25 percent 
chance of being negative, and a 25 percent chance of being higher than US$11 PPP. 
The  95  percent prediction interval is almost three times wider than the OLS 
 estimator’s 95 percent interval. The full pooling model will tend to underestimate 
this uncertainty when effects are heterogeneous, as appears to be the case here.18 
Even when there is some similarity in the impact across contexts, the uncertainty 
generated by a lack of perfect homogeneity across studies remains important for 
quantifying uncertainty around future impacts.
The finding that the treatment effects of microcredit are reasonably  informative 
for one another differs from the conclusions of Pritchett and Sandefur (2015).
This is because they analyzed each study separately before comparing the results: 
this  procedure does not permit pooling of information across studies and thus retains 
that heterogeneity, which is due to sampling variation. Because they restrict their 
analysis to the no pooling model, it is not surprising that they find more  dispersion 
in the  estimated treatment effects. I also find less heterogeneity in effects than is 
 suggested by Vivalt (2016), perhaps because that analysis includes  observational
studies. Overall, my results suggest that much of the apparent dispersion in the 
reported treatment effects is due to sampling variation, and that the genuine 
 underlying heterogeneity is smaller than previously thought.
18 The one exception here is for consumer durables, where the Bayesian hierarchical results are more precise. 
This is because the sampling variation is particularly large for the durables variable. 
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Figure 6. Posterior Predictive Distributions for the Next Site,  τ K+1 from the 
Independent Model, Compared with OLS 
Note: Interpretation as in Figure 5.
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V. Understanding Heterogeneity in Treatment Effects
A. Household-Level Covariates
Understanding the genuine heterogeneity in treatment effects across sites 
remains an important task even when that heterogeneity is smaller than initially 
thought. Ideally, economists would like to understand how covariates that capture 
 contextual variation between the studies predict the heterogeneity between the 
observed  treatment effects. Household-level covariates may be able to explain the 
 heterogeneity, or they may simply identify the subgroups in which the  heterogeneity 
across sites is located. In the microcredit context, researchers  identified  several 
 potentially  important covariates such as a household’s previous business  experience, 
urban versus rural household location, and group versus individual loans (Banerjee,
Karlan, and Zinman 2015). Unfortunately, loan type and urban versus rural loca-
tions did not vary within site at all for five of the seven studies. By contrast, prior 
 business ownership varied within site for all studies except Karlan and Zinman 
(2011), so this is the natural variable to examine in detail.19
I fit the interactions model from equation (3), incorporating a binary  indicator
on whether the household already operated a business before any microcredit 
 expansion and enforcing independence in the parent distribution for tractability. 
Denote this variable  PB ik , where  PB ik = 1 if the household operated a business
prior to the microcredit intervention. The results from fitting the fully interacted 
model with this covariate show that the households where  PB ik = 1 exhibit muc 
h more  heterogeneity in treatment effects across sites. Figure 7 shows the poste-
rior  distributions of the general impacts for the two groups, and Figure 9 shows 
the  posterior distributions of the impacts for each group in each site. While reve-
nues and expenditures seem to rise for both groups — albeit less for the group with 
new  businesses — only the households with prior business experience are likely to 
be  making profits. In fact, for those without prior businesses the treatment effect 
on profit is almost exactly zero in every site (panel A of Figure 9). Perhaps these
new business owners are less productive types, or perhaps it requires learning, 
 experimentation, or time with their business before they can make profit.
The increased heterogeneity across sites in the group with prior business 
 experience is also evident in much wider posterior predictive distributions, as shown 
in Figure 8. This suggests that when microcredit causes change to occur, its impact 
is in fact quite heterogeneous across contexts. Overall, these results solidify the 
conclusion that for households without business experience, microcredit typically 
has negligible impact: if, as Yunus hoped, beggars can leave the streets because 
of microcredit, they do not do it often enough or fast enough for it to show up 
in these seven RCTs.20 This could be due to the microfinance contract discourag-
ing the kind of risky, illiquid investment often required to begin new businesses. 
19 This analysis is hampered by lack of individual-level baseline surveys, as many household covariates recorded 
at endline are plausibly affected by microfinance. 
20 It could be that RCT endline surveys are done too close to the intervention time to capture the eventual 
 success of these endeavors, in which case long-term follow-ups should be done to shed light on this question. 
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Posterior treatment effects by prior business ownership
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Figure 7. Posterior Distributions of  τ for All Outcomes Split by 
Prior Business Ownership
Notes: For the BHM, the thin line covers the central 95 percent posterior interval, the box 
 covers the central 50 percent posterior interval, and the vertical bar within the box marks the 
posterior mean. For the OLS, the thin line covers the standard 95 percent confidence interval, 
the box covers a 50 percent confidence interval computed in the same way, and the vertical bar 
within the box marks the estimate.
Figure 8. Posterior Predictive Distributions of  τ  K+1 Split by Prior Business Ownership 
Notes: For the BHM, the thin line covers the central 95 percent posterior predictive interval, 
the box covers the central 50 percent posterior predictive interval, and the vertical bar within 
the box marks the posterior mean. For the OLS, the thin line covers the standard 95 percent 
confidence interval, the box covers a 50 percent confidence interval computed in the same way, 
and the vertical bar within the box marks the estimate.
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Figure 9. Posterior Distributions of  τ k for All Sites and Outcomes Split by Prior Business Ownership 
Notes: For the BHM, the thin line covers the central 95 percent posterior interval, the box covers the central 
50  percent posterior interval, and the vertical bar within the box marks the posterior mean. For the OLS, the thin line 
covers the standard 95 percent confidence interval, the box covers a 50 percent confidence interval computed in the 
same way, and the vertical bar within the box marks the estimate. Display is truncated in some cases.
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Perhaps  households with existing businesses have alternative uses for credit, such 
as the financing of running costs, that households without businesses do not have. 
In any case, the results here lend credence to the results of Field et al. (2013) in 
suggesting that microloans do not reliably stimulate successful new entrepreneurial 
endeavors.
These results also illustrate how multi-study analysis can help to combat the 
problems of searching over subgroups for statistically significant effects. When the 
researchers who ran the RCT in India (Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, and Kinnan 
2015) checked for this same subgroup, they found a large “statistically significant” 
effect here. But the Bayesian hierarchical analysis of all the sites shows that this is 
not always the case. As shown in Figure 9, in some cases this subgroup displays 
a negligible effect, and in others the effect appears large and negative. While the 
general treatment effect for the subgroup of households who had a previous busi-
ness is indeed much higher than for those without, the predictive distribution of 
this additional effect is diffuse and includes zero comfortably. While there is much 
more evidence of the potential for large effects in this subgroup, there is also more 
substantial heterogeneity in the effects across sites in this group.
B. Site-Level Covariates
Heterogeneity in treatment effects across studies may be predicted or explained 
by variables defined at the site level. The MFIs offered different interest rates and 
loan sizes in each site, and the studies had different protocols and designs which 
might lead them to estimate different average treatment effects. Five  studies 
 randomized at the community level by opening branches in randomly chosen  villages 
or  neighborhoods, but two randomized at the individual level by  offering loans to 
 randomly chosen members of an existing applicant pool. Group-level  randomization 
may detect spillovers or other General Equilibrium (GE) effects that individually 
randomized studies cannot. In addition, the applicant pool in the individually ran-
domized studies has signaled strong interest in microcredit, and the take-up is much 
higher in these studies, leading to concerns that the measured effects may be differ-
ent. But other economic factors such as large differences in the  interest rates offered 
on the loans, or the loan size, or the MFI’s outreach and  targeting policies (summa-
rized in Table 1) might also lead to differences in the effects being estimated. Each 
of these differences in the interventions plausibly  creates  different impacts at the 
group and individual level. The randomization unit may evoke more concern, but as 
this section shows, other variables are stronger predictors of  differences in treatment 
effects.
To understand the influence of all relevant covariates, the ideal procedure would 
be to condition on these site-level variables and estimate a model that quantifies 
their role in predicting treatment effects. Unfortunately, the microcredit literature 
contains only seven experimental studies and at least seven contextual variables of 
interest. Economists are already analyzing the role of certain contextual variables 
they deem important, such as credit market saturation, in isolation from the other 
covariates (see for example Wydick 2015). To estimate these correlations with only 
seven studies, it is necessary to turn to regression methods that prevent  overfitting by 
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using a penalty function, a procedure referred to as “regularization” in the  statistical 
learning literature (Hastie, Tinshirani, and Friedman 2009). Therefore, I regress the
estimated treatment effects from the Bayesian Hierarchical analysis on the relevant 
contextual variables, regularizing the coefficients to force them to be close to zero 
unless there is strong evidence of their explanatory power.
Given the limitations of having only seven studies, I perform a Ridge regression 
with a fixed penalty from which I interpret only the rank ordering of the coefficient 
magnitudes for each of the covariates.21 Ridge regression can also be performed 
within the Bayesian hierarchical models from Section II by modifying the  second 
level of the likelihood to specify the mean as a linear function of covariates. Consider 
a set of  S contextual variables, stored in a vector denoted  W k for site  k . Now  specify 
that  τ k ∼ N(τ +  W k β,  σ τ 2 ) for all sites, and re-estimate the model. The  penalty
 function here consists of a strong prior that each element of the slope vector  β 
is tightly normally distributed around zero. In both the Bayesian and Frequentist 
Ridge procedures, the variables with the strongest predictive power for the pattern in 
 {  τ  k } k=1  K end up with large coefficients despite the penalty (Griffin and Brown 2013).
This motivates the interpretation of coefficient magnitude as a ranking of the 
 covariates’ relative predictive power, in the absence of sufficient data to assess their 
absolute predictive power.
I fit a Ridge model with many site-level contextual variables: the site’s average 
value of the outcome in the control group, a binary indicator on whether the unit of 
study randomization was individuals or communities, a binary indicator on whether 
the MFI targeted female borrowers, the interest rate (APR) at which the MFI in the
study usually lends, a microcredit market saturation metric taking integer values 
from 0 –3, a binary indicator on whether the MFI promoted the loans to the public 
in the treatment areas, a binary indicator on whether the loans were supposed to be 
collateralized, and the loan size as a percentage of the country’s average income 
per capita.22 Table 5 displays the values taken by each of these variables in each 
site, although they must be standardized to have zero mean and unit variance before 
regularization.
The results of the Ridge regression at the study level are shown in Figure 10, 
which displays the absolute magnitude of the coefficients on the various  contextual 
variables for each of the six outcomes. The figure suggests that economic  factors, 
such as whether an MFI targets women, offers a high interest rate or a large loan are 
more predictive of differences in effects than the randomization unit.23 All three have 
negative correlations, suggesting that microloans with lower  interest rates, smaller 
21 Statistical learning methods such as Ridge or Lasso procedures are often “tuned” via cross-validation, but 
this procedure can perform poorly with so few data points. Online Appendix C contains further explanation of this 
problem, and an illustration of it produced by cross-validation at the study-level in the microcredit literature. 
22 To address concerns that the national average incomes are not capturing the relative income of the actual 
 samples in the studies, I also consider loan size as a percentage of the control group’s average income, and the 
results are shown in the online Appendix C. 
23 This could be because of the selection effect of the randomization level, which potentially raises the  average 
productivity of the whole sample including the control group. In that case, randomization unit will be highly 
 correlated with the control group mean, potentially causing a near-multicollinearity problem and preventing any one 
of these variables from appearing important. This argument can be made for many variables, and it is still correct 
to include both the control mean and the unit of randomization in the Ridge regression. But to make the point that 
the unit of randomization is not a strong predictor, I redo the analysis omitting the control mean as an explanatory 
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loan sizes, and no gender targeting may be associated with better  outcomes, though 
no definitive conclusion is possible on the basis of this  exercise. Nonetheless, the 
variable, as shown in online Appendix C. I find that the coefficients on economic variables are still larger than that 
unit of randomization (see Figure B.2 in online Appendix B). 
Table 5 — Contextual Variables Used in Ridge Analysis (Pre-standardization)
Country Randomization Women APR Saturation Promotion Collateral
Loan 
size
Bosnia 1 0 22.0 2 0 1 9.0
Ethiopia 0 0 12.0 1 0 0 118.0
India 0 1 24.0 3 0 0 22.0
Mexico 0 1 100.0 2 1 0 6.0
Mongolia 0 1 24.0 1 0 1 36.0
Morocco 0 0 13.5 0 1 0 21.0
Philippines 1 0 63.0 1 0 0 24.1
Note: Contextual variables: Unit of randomization (1 = individual, 0 = community), Women (1 = MFI  targets 
women, 0 = otherwise), APR (annual interest rate), Saturation metric (3 = highly saturated, 0 = no other 
microlenders operate), Promotion (1 = MFI advertised itself in area, 0 = no advertising), Collateral (1 = MFI 
required collateral, 0 = no collateral required), Loan size (percentage of mean national income).
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Figure 10. Absolute Magnitude of the Ridge Regression Coefficients for All Outcomes and Covariates
Note: Results shown for ridge penalty of size 0.1, but the relative ordering of coefficients is largely invariant to 
 penalty size in the regions tested.
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 evidence here suggests that the observed heterogeneity in effects across  contexts 
seems more likely to be due to economic differences than to study protocols. 
This  finding is robust to alternative definitions of the variables and  alternative 
 specifications (see online Appendix C).
These results may alleviate concerns that the analysis here understates the true 
impact of microcredit services because of existing market saturation in the studied 
contexts, or because the take-up of these particular services was low. The studies 
varied greatly in their pre-existing microcredit market saturation, but this variable 
is not among the most predictive of the variation in effects; low saturation is not 
reliably associated with larger effects, as this concern would suggest. The studies 
also varied greatly in their take-up, which is causally downstream of the unit of 
randomization; the individually randomized studies both had take-up rates of more 
than 80 percent, but they do not reliably exhibit larger effects. Instead, microfinance 
institutions which offer lower interest rates and do not target their services by gender 
are more reliably associated with somewhat larger treatment effects.
VI. Conclusion
A joint assessment of the average impact and heterogeneity across seven 
 randomized evaluations suggests that microcredit access in general does not  transform 
the lives of poor households in measurable ways, as was initially hoped. Yet there is 
little evidence that microcredit causes over-indebtedness or destroys  livelihoods due 
to credit bubbles. The moderate heterogeneity in effects across  studies may alleviate 
concerns about the external validity of these RCTs:  approximately 60 percent of the 
initially observed variation in estimated effects is sampling variation. The  studies’ 
treatment effects provide reasonable signals of the effects in other study sites, and are 
thus likely to contain predictive information about a broader class of sites. However, 
even the moderate heterogeneity detected is enough to generate different results for 
the Bayesian predictive effect  τ K+1 relative to the results of classical meta-analysis.
Several potential directions for future work arise from the analysis of  covariates. 
Households with previous business experience often see larger effects from 
 microcredit access, but these effects vary so widely across studies as to prevent 
general conclusions of positive impact for this group. Investigating the correlation 
between the treatment effects and study protocols, intervention characteristics and 
economic contexts, I find that interest rates, loan sizes, and targeting gender are 
more predictive than the unit of randomization or other evaluation protocols. Thus, 
further work to assess the causal impact of altering certain features of loan contracts, 
such as in Field et al. (2013), may be warranted.
Finally, it remains possible that microcredit could affect household or village 
welfare without affecting average outcomes: perhaps households use these loans to 
manage risk, or the effects are heterogeneous across quantiles within  studies (e.g.,
Crépon et  al. 2015). However, quantile treatment effects have different technical
properties to average treatment effects and require substantially different  models for 
aggregation which I address in a separate paper (Meager 2016). Another  potential 
concern with the analysis here is the strict inclusion criterion allowing only RCTs. 
There are limits to the contexts in which one can randomize treatment;  observational 
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studies of microfinance could provide additional insights. Developing new 
 aggregation methods to accommodate different types of studies may be  necessary to 
improve our understanding of microcredit and many other interventions.
Appendix A: Technical Details of Estimation
Estimating the unknown parameters specified in the hierarchical likelihoods of 
models such as the one described in equations (1) and (2) is challenging because 
the likely values of the parameters on the lower level are influenced by the  values 
of the parameters at the upper level, which introduces ripples in the likelihood 
(Betancourt and Girolami 2013). In theory, either Maximum Likelihood methods 
or Bayesian methods can be used, but in practice there are strong reasons to prefer 
Bayesian inference for this problem. The primary issue with Maximum Likelihood 
is that to get tractability the estimation is done via “Empirical Bayes,” which first 
estimates the upper level parameters and then plugs these point estimates into the 
lower level to estimate the lower level parameters. By conditioning on a single value 
of the  hyperparameters  (τ,  σ τ 2 ) , this procedure systematically underestimates the 
 uncertainty at the lower level of the model. By contrast, Bayesian inference  proceeds 
via estimation of the full joint posterior distribution of all unknown  parameters 
simultaneously, from which the marginal distributions provide accurate uncertainty 
intervals.
The Bayesian approach does not require the compromises typically made by 
the MLE method for tractability because it performs estimation using a powerful 
simulation technique called Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods. These methods 
require a proper posterior distribution as the target distribution, and this property can 
be guaranteed by the use of proper prior distributions on the unknown  parameters. 
These priors also allow the researcher to improve the estimation by targeting regions 
of the parameter space that are more likely to contain relevant values; if only vague 
knowledge of this is obtainable, then the priors can be made quite diffuse ( sometimes 
called “weakly informative).” If substantial expert knowledge of the likely values 
is available before seeing the data, this can of course be incorporated via stronger 
 priors. Even if the prior distributions are incorrectly centered, sufficiently diffuse 
priors can still improve the mean squared error of the estimation by reducing the 
variance at the cost of some increase in bias—that is, the prior constrains the fit 
of the model and thus regularizes the estimates (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman 
2009).
The posterior distribution for the basic full-data model is proportional to the 
product of the likelihood in equation (2) and the prior in equation (5):
(A1)  p(τ, μ,  τ 1 ,  τ 2 , …|Y ) ∝  ∏ 
i=1
N
  ∏ 
k=1
 
K
 (N  ( y ik |  μ k +  τ k  T ik ,  σ yk 2 ) ) 
 ×  ∏ 
k=1
 
K
 (N (( μ k ,  τ k )|( μ, τ ), V) ) × N ((μ, τ )|(0, 0),  I 2 ) 
 × Cauchy(0, 10) × LKJcorr (3) .
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This is not a known distribution, but it can be fully characterized via simulation 
using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods (MCMC). The basic intuition behind
MCMC methods is the construction of a Markov chain, which has the posterior 
 distribution as its invariant distribution, so that in the limit, the draws from the chain 
are ergodic draws from the posterior. This chain is constructed by drawing from 
known distributions at each “step” and using a probabilistic accept/reject rule for
the draw based on how likely the draw was to have been generated by the  posterior. 
This can be calculated on a draw-by-draw basis without having to evaluate the 
entire  function, and because more likely draws are proportionally more likely to be 
accepted.
I use a particular subset of MCMC methods called Hamiltonian Monte Carlo 
(HMC) methods throughout this paper, which are particularly suited to  estimating
hierarchical models (Betancourt and Girolami 2013). HMC uses  discretized
Hamiltonian dynamics to sample from the posterior, and has shown good 
 performance especially combined with the No-U-Turn sampling method (NUTS) to
auto-tune the step sizes in the chain (Hoffman and Gelman and 2014). HMC with
NUTS is easy to implement because it can be done automatically in Stan, which is a 
free software module that calls C++ to fit Bayesian models from R or Python (Stan
Development Team 2014). Stan often requires no more input from the user than
typing the equations for the likelihood and priors, although more complex models 
benefit from code written more efficiently than that. Stan automatically reports the 
posterior means (e.g.,  τ ̃ for  τ ) and their marginalized posterior variances (e.g.,  se ̃ τ 2 ),
 supplying both the parameter values most likely to be true given the data and the 
degree of certainty we should have about their value. Stan also automatically reports 
the marginal 95 percent credible intervals and 50 percent credible intervals. Credible 
intervals are the Bayesian counterpart of confidence intervals, but they admit a direct 
probability interpretation: the probability that an unknown parameter lies in the  α 
percent credible interval is  α percent.
Stan also computes and reports several performance metrics and convergence 
diagnostics for the HMC in every model it fits. First, it reports the Monte Carlo 
error of the posterior mean, which should be small relative to the magnitude of the 
mean if the sampler has converged. Second, it computes the  R ˆ metric of Gelman 
and Rubin (1992) by randomly perturbing the starting points for the HMC chains
and then checking the between variance of the chains relative to the within-chain 
variance. If all the chains have converged to the posterior, their within variance 
should be the same as their between variance: the  R ˆ is the ratio of these variances 
and should be close to 1. For each model, I run 4 chains and accept  R ˆ < 1.1 .
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